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BY ARTHUR S. LEONARD
| Ruling on a custody contest
between a birth mother, Kimberly
Jayroe Strickland, and her former
same-sex spouse, Christina
Strickland, on April 5, the
Mississippi Supreme Court blocked
Kimberly’s effort to contest
Christina’s parental status.
Most states employ what is known
as parental presumption in
automatically recognizing the
spouse of a woman who gives birth
as a parent to the child, but the
Mississippi court made no mention
of that doctrine, instead relying on
what is called “equitable estoppel”
to prevent Kimberly from
contesting Christina’s rights as a
parent. As a result, the state’s high
court refrained from resolving a
critical question of same-sex family
law.
Five written opinions were signed
by different combinations of judges
Christina Strickland scored a victory in her claim to parental rights in a complex
on the nine-member court, with
ruling from the Mississippi Supreme Court that shed no light on the underlying
none representing the views of a
majority, but taken together they
question of whether both mothers in a lesbian marriage are presumed to be
produce a holding that an
entitled to parental rights regarding a child born to one of them. |
anonymous sperm donor’s role in
LAMBDALEGAL.ORG
the child’s birth is irrelevant in
determining the rights of the birth mother’s former spouse.
Mississippi Supreme Court rejects any consideration of anonymous sperm donor
The high court reversed a ruling by Judge John S. Grant, III, of the Rankin County Chancery Court, that the
lack of a waiver of parental rights from that sperm donor prevents Christina from being recognized as the
child’s legal parent.
The case is complicated because most of the story played out before marriage equality came to Mississippi in
2015 and also due to that state’s retrograde legislature neglecting to adopt needed statutes concerning
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parental rights in cases when a woman or a couple uses an anonymous donor’s sperm.
Christina Strickland and Kimberly Jayroe began their relationship in 1999 and in 2007 finalized the adoption
of a child, E.J.. Because Mississippi did not allow joint adoptions by unmarried couples, only Kimberly was
the legal adoptive parent of E.J.. In 2009, the couple traveled to Massachusetts to marry, even though their
union was not recognized back home, and Kimberly took Christina’s last name.
The following year, the Stricklands decided to have a child using anonymously donated sperm from a
Maryland sperm bank. Kimberly, whom they jointly decided would bear the child, signed the sperm bank’s
form providing that she would “never seek to identify the donor” and that the donor would not be advised of
her identity. In the Maryland clinic, Kimberly was recognized as a married woman and Christina was
identified as her spouse in its paperwork. The two women signed the form acknowledging they were
participating in the insemination process as a married couple and would both be parents of the resulting
child.
According Justice David Ishee’s plurality opinion, “Christina testified that she was involved in and supportive
through every step of the conception and pregnancy.” She also testified that the couple had planned to travel
to Massachusetts for the baby’s delivery so that their marriage would be recognized and both be recorded as
parents on the birth certificate. Six weeks before her due date, however, Kimberly gave birth to the child, Z.S.,
in an emergency cesarean section procedure in a Mississippi hospital. Since Mississippi did not recognize
their marriage at that time, the birth certificate shows Kimberly as the only parent.
Over the next two years, the women functioned as a family unit, raising both E.J. and Z.S. as co-parents.
Christina stayed home for the first year of Z.S.’s life, while Kimberly worked full time. Christina testified that
both children call her “mom.” After the women separated in January 2013, Christina continued to visit both
children and paid child support and medical and daycare expenses for Z.S.
Here the case took a strange twist: in August 2015, while still married to Christina — and at a time when, due
to the US Supreme Court’s marriage equality ruling two months earlier, Mississippi was legally obligated to
recognize the couple’s marriage — Kimberly married a second spouse, whose name and gender are not
identified by the court. Kimberly is, however, identified by the court as Kimberly Jayroe Strickland Day.
That marriage prompted Christina to file a divorce petition in Harrison County Chancery Court on August 31,
2015. Two months later, Kimberly filed a motion for a declaratory judgment that her second marriage was
valid and her first marriage “dissolved” in Rankin County Circuit Court. Christina answered with a
counterclaim for divorce and legal and physical custody of both children, who were then living with Kimberly.
She also sought to be named as Z.S.’s legal parent.
The two cases were consolidated in the Rankin County court. On May 17, 2016, Judge Grant issued an order
declaring that Christina and Kimberly’s 2009 Massachusetts marriage was valid and recognized in
Mississippi and therefore that Kimberly’s second marriage was void.
This led the women to negotiate an agreement that since Z.S. was born during their marriage, they would
jointly pay all school expenses for the child, and that Kimberly would retain physical and legal custody of E.J.,
the adoptive child. They agreed to let the chancery court decide custody, visitation, and child support issues
for Z.S., child support and visitation issues for E.J., and the question of Christina’s parental status toward Z.S.
Grant’s final judgment of divorce, in October 2016, ordered Christina to pay child support for both children
and held that Z.S. was born during a valid marriage. But, he ruled, Z.S. was “a child born during the marriage,
but not of the marriage,” so both women were not considered to be Z.S.’s parents. Grant viewed the
anonymous sperm donor as “an absent father” whose legal parentage “precluded a determination that
Christina was Z.S.’s legal parent.” The court held that she was, however, entitled to visitation with Z.S. under
a doctrine called “in loco parentis,” which dictated that acting as a parent and bonding with the child entitled
Christina to visitation even though she has no legal relation to Z.S.
Christina appealed, arguing that because Z.S. was born while Christina was married to Kimberly, Christina
should be deemed the child’s legal parent, and that the anonymous sperm donor, who had no relationship to
the child, could not possibly be considered its legal parent.
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The Mississippi Supreme Court agreed with Christina that the sperm donor is out of the picture and should
not be considered a parent. Justice Ishee’s opinion, for himself and three other justices, declared that Grant’s
finding that the sperm donor was the child’s “natural father” was erroneous as a matter of law.
“[W]e never before have determined what parental rights, if any, anonymous sperm donors possess in the
children conceived through the use of their sperm,” he wrote. “As such, this is an issue of first impression.”
That is a startling statement coming from a State Supreme Court in 2018, when donor insemination has been
around for half a century and most states have adopted legislation on the subject. The only statute regarding
donor insemination, Ishee noted, is a provision barring a man from seeking to deny paternity when a child is
born to his wife via the procedure.
“How,” asked Ishee, “on the one hand, can the law contemplate that a donor is a legal parent who must have
his rights terminated, while at the same time prohibiting the non-biological father of a child conceived
through [artificial insemination] from disestablishing paternity? These two policies cannot co-exist.”
It would be “intrusive, time-consuming, and expensive,” he argued, for a judge to have to determine that an
anonymous sperm donor, who never intended to be the parent of the child, had “abandoned” the child, thus
making the child available for adoption by their mother’s spouse.
In her appeal, Christina raised alternative arguments in support of her claims to be Z.S.’s parent. First, she
asked the court to determine a question not addressed in Mississippi law: “Whether children born to married
parents who give birth to a child via [artificial reproductive technology] with sperm from an anonymous
donor are entitled to the marital presumption that both spouses are their legal parents.”
Alternatively, she asked whether the US Supreme Court’s 2015 marriage equality ruling “requires Mississippi
to apply laws relating to the marital presumption of parentage in a gender-neutral manner so as to apply
equally to married same-sex couples.”
And she also asked whether the doctrine of “equitable estoppel” could be used to preclude a birth mother
from trying to “disestablish her spouse’s parentage of the couple’s marital child based solely on the absence of
a genetic relationship, when the child was born as a result of anonymous donor insemination, to which both
spouses consented.”
Christina argued that Grant’s order violated her constitutionally protected liberty and equality interests by
failing to recognize her parental relationship with Z.S.
Ishee’s opinion focused only on “equitable estoppel,” which he held precluded Kimberly from now disavowing
the words and actions that Christina relied on in acting as a parent to their child. The judge rejected
Kimberly’s argument that the decision to have a child through donor insemination was solely hers and that
her marriage to Christina at the time was irrelevant. Ishee found that “the evidence in the record belies this
assertion,” and cited chapter and verse, right down to the birth announcements the women sent out, which
identified the women as “two chicks” who had “hatched” the child.
Since Kimberly represented to Christina all along that Christina would be a parent of Z.S., the doctrine of
equitable estoppel blocks her from arguing to the contrary in the context of their divorce proceeding. Grant’s
award of “in loco parentis” status to Christina was insufficient, in Ishee’s view, to protect her legitimate
interests. If Kimberly were to marry somebody else and petition for her new spouse to adopt Z.S., Christina’s
“in loco parentis” status would not entitle her to prevent that adoption. If the court recognizes her as a parent,
she could.
Without ever mentioning the parental presumption, then, the plurality opinion reversed Judge Grant’s ruling
that Christina acted “in loco parentis” but “was not an equal parent with parental rights to Z.S.” The court
sent the case back to Rankin County Chancery Court to determine custody using the customary standard
focused on the best interest of the child. A “guardian ad litem” was appointed to represent the child in the
proceedings.
In an concurring opinion characterized as a concurrence “in part and in the result,” Chief Justice William
Waller, Jr., joined in part by four other justices, wrote that even though the court “can use common-law
http://gaycitynews.nyc/birth-mother-cant-challenge-wifes-parental-rights/

3/4

8/21/2018

Birth Mother Can’t Challenge Ex-Wife’s Parental Rights - Gay City News | Gay City News

principles to render a decision here, the Legislature should speak directly to the recognition of the legal status
of children born during a marriage as a result of assisted reproductive technology.”
Other opinions in the case challenged either the use of the equitable estoppel doctrine or the holding on what
rights an anonymous sperm donor may or may not have, so the direction this case gives to lower courts in
Mississippi is a muddle. Still, in this case, Christina has scored a victory to the extent that enough members of
the court agreed with the equitable estoppel approach to make that part of the holding of the court, tossing
the case back to the trial court to decide anew whether it is in the best interest of Z.S. for Christina to have
joint or primary custody of the child as a parent.
Critically, however, the state’s high court, for now, has made no finding on the underlying question of
whether a child born to a married lesbian couple is automatically deemed to be the legal offspring of both
women. Under other circumstances, then, a Mississippi co-parent may find herself having to litigate this issue
to protect her rights regarding a child she has been raising with her same-sex spouse.
Christina is represented by Mississippi attorney Dianne Herman Ellis and Lambda Legal staff attorney
Elizabeth Lynn Littrell. Kimberly is represented by Prentiss M. Grant.

http://gaycitynews.nyc/birth-mother-cant-challenge-wifes-parental-rights/

4/4

